

## Message Text

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SUBJECT: CCD CLOSING STATEMENT

NATO PASS TO GIVAN, US REP, NATO DISARMAMENT EXPERTS MEETTNG

FOLLOWING IS FIRST SECTION OF CLEARED APRIL 10 CCD STATEMFNT

1. CONVENTIONAL ARMS HAVE A CENTRAL PLACE IN THE MILITARY  
PLANNING OF VIRTUALLY EVERY COUNTRY OF THE WORLD, A DAILY  
AND ALMOST COMMONPLACE ROLE IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS, AND A PROFOUND LONG-TERM IMPACT ON THE SECURITY OF  
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US ALL. DESPITE--OR PERHAPS MORE REALISTICALLY--BECAUSE OF  
THESE FACTORS, THE SUBJECT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL HAS  
OCCUPIED THE EFFORTS OF THE CCD ONLY RARELY IN RECENT YEARS.

2. MY GOVERNMENT HAS LONG STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING SERIOUS AND DETAILED CONSIDERATION TO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE RESTRAINTS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. IN THIS COMMITTEE, WE HAVE OFTEN STATED OUR BELIEF THAT SUITABLE RESTRAINT IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS FIELD COULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF ALL STATES. IN INTERVENTIONS OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE US TO EXPLORE ALL PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM AND HAVE URGED OTHER DELEGATIONS TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS.

3. ONE OF THE APPROACHES THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS DISCUSSED IN THE COMMITTEE IS THAT OF REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL. IN 1966, WE PRESENTED SIX PRINCIPLES WHICH COULD BE USED AS A BASIS FOR REGIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS FIELD. IN 1970, WE RECOMMENDED THREE ADDITIONAL STEPS THAT STATES COULD TAKE UNILATERALLY - "STEPS WHICH, IN THEIR CUMULATIVE EFFECT, EVEN WITHOUT FORMAL BINDING AGREEMENTS, COULD CONSTITUTE RELIABLE ARMS LIMITATIONS ON A REGIONAL BASIS" (CCD/PV.487).

4. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS WHY MY DELEGATION BELIEVES IT MAY BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER RESTRAINTS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT. FIRST, THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF A COUNTRY'S ARMED FORCES TO THE ARMED FORCES OF OTHER STATES WITHIN ITS REGION IS IN MOST CASES MUCH MORE RELEVANT TO THE SECURITY OF THAT COUNTRY THAN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITS FORCES AND THOSE OF MORE DISTANT POWERS. SECOND, STATES NEAR ONE ANOTHER HAVE GENERALLY TENDED TO ACQUIRE SIMILAR AND COMPARABLE MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THIRD, IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE WORLD THERE ALREADY EXIST REGIONAL COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD SERVE AS USEFUL PRECEDENTS FOR ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES AS WELL AS REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS WHICH COULD MOST CONVENIENTLY TAKE ACTION ON SUCH INITIATIVES.

5. ALTHOUGH THESE FACTORS SUGGEST WHY, IN GENERAL, THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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REGIONAL OR SUB-REGIONAL APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL MIGHT BE PRACTICABLE AND EFFECTIVE, ACTUAL PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS OBVIOUSLY VARY WIDELY FROM ONE REGION TO ANOTHER. IN SEVERAL AREAS OF THE WORLD THE PREVAILING POLITICAL CLIMATE MAY NOT FOR SOME TIME PERMIT THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF FAR-REACHING ARMS LIMITATION ARRANGEMENTS.

6. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED THAT IN TWO REGIONS OF THE WORLD THERE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. IN EUROPE, MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT HAVE BEEN

ACTIVELY SEEKING A MUTUAL AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION OF THE CONTINENT. IN LATIN AMERICA, EIGHT GOVERNMENTS OF THAT REGION AGREED, IN THEIR DECLARATION OF AYACUCHO OF DECEMBER 9, 1974, TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH PERMIT EFFECTIVE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS, TO PUT AN END TO THE ACQUISITION OF ARMS FOR OFFENSIVE WARLIKE PURPOSES, AND TO DEDICATE ALL POSSIBLE RESOURCES TO THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. REPRESENTATIVES FROM SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY MET IN LIMA, PERU, TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE MEANS OF ACHIEVING ARMS LIMITATIONS. THE UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF THESE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND HOPES THEY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN REACHING SOLUTIONS THAT FURTHER THE WORTHY GOALS OUTLINED AT AYACUCHO.

7. MY GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO REGARD THE REGIONAL APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AS A PARTICULARLY PROMISING ONE. IN ADDITION TO THE DIRECT VALUE OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORKABLE MEASURES IN ONE REGION MAY PROVIDE USEFUL INSIGHTS FOR SOLVING ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE.

8. A SOUND PRINCIPLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS--ONE WHICH WE HAVE ENDORSED ON SEVERAL PREVIOUS OCCASIONS--IS THAT THE INITIATIVE SHOULD COME FROM WITHIN THE REGION CONCERNED. THIS PRINCIPLE REFLECTS THE VIEW THAT, IN ORDER FOR A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT TO BE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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EFFECTIVE AND DURABLE, IT MUST BE FIRMLY GROUNDED IN THE DESIRES AND CONCERNs OF THE LOCAL PARTIES, WHO ARE OBVIOUSLY THE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED.

9. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATES OUTSIDE THE REGION CONCERNED CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT, PERHAPS ESSENTIAL, SUPPORTIVE ROLE IN THE SUCCESS OF A REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT. THE WILLINGNESS OF OUTSIDE POWERS, PARTICULARLY POTENTIAL ARMS SUPPLIERS, TO RESPECT REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CAN OPERATE AS A STRONG INDUCEMENT TO DEVELOP LOCAL INITIATIVES, SINCE IT CAN PROVIDE ASSURANCE BOTH TO LOCAL PARTIES AND TO OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS THAT THEIR EFFORTS WILL NOT BE UNDERMINED. OUTSIDE POWERS MIGHT RESPECT A REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT IN A VARIETY OF WAYS. THEY WOULD PRESUMABLY BE EXPECTED TO AGREE NOT TO TAKE ACTIONS INCONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRICTIONS WORKED OUT BY THE LOCAL STATES, THUS REINFORCING THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY REGIONAL PARTIES AND CREATING A DOUBLE GUARANTEE OF COMPLIANCE. ANOTHER WAY OF RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE TO PROVIDE LOCAL PARTIES WITH MILITARY

EQUIPMENT NOT PROSCRIBED AND TO RENDER OTHER TYPES OF SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE THAT MIGHT BE IMPORTANT IN SATISFYING THOSE PARTIES THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY THE ARRANGEMENT.

10. THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO ASSIST AND COOPERATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN WAYS DESIRED BY THE LOCAL PARTICIPANTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPECT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER PROVIDED OF COURSE THAT THE MEASURES DO NOT IMPINGE UPON THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE PARTICIPANTS OR UNDERMINE EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CONTRARY TO

THEIR WISHES, AND ALSO PROVIDED THAT OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS RESPECT THE ARRANGEMENTS.

11. WHILE PURSUING THE POSSIBILITIES OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO EXPLORE WAYS OF MAKING PROGRESS IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS FIELD IN A BROADER CONTEXT AS WELL. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS COMMITTEE, IN WHICH COUNTRIES FROM ALL REGIONS OF THE WORLD ARE REP-

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RESENTED, CAN MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION BY EXAMINING APPROACHES TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL THAT ARE NOT LIMITED IN GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE AND THAT COULD COMPLEMENT REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

12. TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST ONE SUCH APPROACH. MY DELEGATION BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE CCD TO IDENTIFY AND DISCUSS PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT THAT COULD BE APPLICABLE ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS TO THE ACQUISITION OR TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. BEFORE OUTLINING SOME IDEAS ABOUT THE CONTENT OF SUCH PRINCIPLES, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH MY DELEGATION BELIEVES SHOULD UNDERLIE CONVENTIONAL ARMS PRINCIPLES OF THIS TYPE.

13. ANY PRACTICAL ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINTS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS MUST BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT, IN TODAY'S WORLD, STATES WILL BE DETERMINED TO ACQUIRE THE MEANS NECESSARY TO SAFEGUARD THEIR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE ACQUISITION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS MAY INDEED REINFORCE THE STABILITY OF A LOCAL MILITARY BALANCE AND THEREFORE REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF TENSIONS AND CONFLICT.

14. ALL OF US RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS ANOTHER SIDE TO THE IMPACT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. IN OUR INTER-DEPENDENT WORLD--WITH ITS PANOPLY OF MODERN WEAPON SYSTEMS, THE INCREASING ABILITY OF MOST STATES TO MANUFACTURE

OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE VIRTUALLY ALL THE ARMS THEY DESIRE, AND RAPID COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA WHICH OFTEN ALERT STATES TO THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS ACTIVITIES OF OTHERS--THE CONTINUING ACCUMULATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DOES NOT NECESSARILY GUARANTEE INCREASED SECURITY. IN SEEKING TO PROVIDE FOR ONE'S OWN DEFENSE NEEDS, THE SECURITY OF OTHERS MAY OFTEN

BE AFFECTED AND THE ACQUISITION OF ARMS BY ONE STATE MAY LEAD TO COMPETITIVE REACTIONS, OR OVER-REACTIONS, BY OTHERS, RESULTING IN A DECREASED SENSE OF SECURITY FOR ALL CONCERNED.

15. ANY PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOTH  
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OF THESE SIDES OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS ISSUE. IN LIGHT OF THE LEGITIMATE AND OFTEN PRESSING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF STATES, IT WOULD HARDLY BE REALISTIC TO DEVELOP GUIDELINES THAT WOULD PREVENT THE ACQUISITION OF ARMS ALTOGETHER OR WOULD IMPOSE LIMITS MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR STATES TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS. INSTEAD, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF SUCH PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE STATES TO LIMIT ACQUISITIONS TO ESSENTIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND THEREBY REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE ACQUISITION OF ARMS WILL APPEAR THREATENING TO OTHERS AND INCREASE TENSIONS AMONG STATES.

16. ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION RELATES TO THE NATURE OF THE RESTRAINTS THAT WOULD BE CALLED FOR IN PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT. WHILE FORMAL AND LEGALLY-BINDING FORMS OF RESTRAINT ARE OFTEN DESIRABLE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD, AND MAY BE PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE IN THE CASE OF REGIONAL CONVENTIONAL ARMS ARRANGEMENTS, IT SEEMS PREMATURE--CONSIDERING THE VERY EARLY STAGE OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS AREA AND THE VASTLY DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROBLEM HELD BY COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD--TO EXPECT STATES TO ACCEPT FIRM OBLIGATIONS THAT WOULD BE APPLICABLE ON A WORLDWIDE BASIS. ACCORDINGLY, ANY UNIVERSALLY-APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT SHOULD, AT LEAST INITIALLY, RELY LARGELY ON THE SELF-RESTRAINT OF STATES. SUCH PRINCIPLES SHOULD ENCOURAGE GOVERNMENTS TO BE FULLY AWARE THAT THEIR ACTIONS AFFECT THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF OTHERS AND TO EXERCISE APPROPRIATE RESTRAINTS IN ORDER THAT SUCH ACTIONS WILL NOT HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES, NOT ONLY FOR OTHER STATES, BUT FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY AS WELL.

17. MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT SUCH AN APPROACH COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT DAMPING EFFECT ON THE COMPETITION IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS. SELF-RESTRAINT BY ONE WOULD CREATE INCENTIVES FOR SELF-RESTRAINT BY OTHERS. HOWEVER, I WISH TO

EMPHASIZE THAT SUCH A VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES APPROACH COULD  
NOT SUCCEED IF THE WILLINGNESS OF SOME STATES TO ABIDE BY  
THE GUIDELINES WERE NOT MATCHED BY THE SELF-RESTRAINT OF  
OTHERS WHOSE COOPERATION IS DEEMED IMPORTANT. THUS, IT  
WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT ONE ARMS SUPPLIER TO CON-  
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TINUE TO RESTRAIN HIS SHIPMENTS IF OTHER SUPPLIERS WERE  
DETERMINED SIMPLY TO TAKE UP THE SLACK. LIKEWISE, WE  
COULD NOT EXPECT CONTINUED SELF-RESTRAINT IN THE ACQUISI-  
TION OF ARMS IF SUCH RESTRAINT WERE NOT RECIPROCATED.

18. A THIRD CONSIDERATION IS THE WIDE VARIATION NOT ONLY  
IN THE TYPES AND MILITARY MISSIONS OF THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS

CURRENTLY IN EXISTENCE, BUT ALSO IN THE EFFECTS THEY ARE  
LIKELY TO HAVE IN DIFFERING REGIONS OF THE WORLD. THE  
POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL STABILITY  
OF A PARTICULAR ARMS ACQUISITION DEPEND ON MANY FACTORS.  
AMONG THESE ARE THE QUANTITIES INVOLVED, THE EXTENT TO  
WHICH THE ACQUISITION PROVIDES THE ACQUIRING STATE WITH A  
NEW MILITARY CAPABILITY; THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACQUIRING  
STATE'S ARMED FORCES TO THOSE OF OTHER STATES WHOSE  
SECURITY CALCULATIONS MIGHT BE AFFECTED; THE PERCEPTIONS  
BY LEADERS OF THESE OTHER STATES OF HOW THE ACQUISITION  
AFFECTS THE BALANCE OF FORCES; AND HOW COMPATIBLE THE NEW  
WEAPON SYSTEMS ARE WITH THE ACQUIRING STATE'S TECHNICAL  
AND SUPPORT CAPABILITIES, CLIMATIC AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS,  
AND OTHER WEAPON SYSTEMS ALREADY IN ITS INVENTORY.

19. THESE ARE, OF COURSE, ONLY A FEW OF THE MANY FACTORS  
THAT DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF ARMS ACQUISITIONS INTER-  
NATIONALLY. THEY DEMONSTRATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE IMPACT OF  
ARMS ACQUISITIONS ON STABILITY DEPENDS AS MUCH ON THE  
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTEXT IN WHICH ARMS ARE ACQUIRED  
AS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEAPONS THEMSELVES. IT  
WOULD RARELY BE POSSIBLE TO SINGLE OUT SPECIFIC WEAPONS OR  
CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS THAT WOULD BE LIKELY TO HAVE THE  
SAME IMPACT ON STABILITY IN ALL SITUATIONS THROUGHOUT THE  
WORLD. IN SOME REGIONS, THE ACQUISITION OF SMALL ARMS AND  
AMMUNITION MIGHT CONTRIBUTE MORE TO INSECURITY THAN THE  
ACQUISITION OF ADVANCED JET AIRCRAFT. IN OTHER AREAS, THE  
REVERSE MIGHT BE TRUE.

20. BECAUSE OF THE DIVERSITY OF LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES, WE  
THINK THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS GUIDELINES APPLICABLE ON A  
WORLDWIDE BASIS SHOULD ENCOURAGE STATES TO EXERCISE JUDG-  
MENT IN MAKING THE DETERMINATION WHETHER, IN A CERTAIN  
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POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTEXT, THE ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS IN CERTAIN TYPES OR QUANTITIES WOULD BE LIKELY TO HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. SINCE SUCH A DETERMINATION INEVITABLY HAS A SUBJECTIVE COMPONENT, THE GUIDELINES WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE GOVERNMENTS WITH FLEXIBILITY IN MAKING ARMS ACQUISITION DECISIONS.

21. A FINAL CONSIDERATION IN DEVELOPING PRACTICAL GUIDELINES CONCERNs THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL ARMS ACQUISITIONS AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. IN MY DELEGATION'S VIEW, SUCH GUIDELINES SHOULD CALL ON GOVERNMENTS TO THINK OF SECURITY AS MORE THAN A STRICTLY MILITARY CONCEPT; IN PARTICULAR, TO RECOGNIZE THAT REAL SECURITY LIES NOT ONLY IN ADEQUATE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, BUT ALSO IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

22. THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS SUGGEST THE TYPES OF RESTRAINTS THAT MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE EMBODIED IN PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS FIELD. ONE PRINCIPLE MIGHT CALL ON STATES TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING THE JUDGMENT THAT THE ARMS THEY ACQUIRE OR TRANSFER WILL NOT HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, THE REQUIREMENTS OF STABILITY MAY DIFFER MARKEDLY FROM ONE SITUATION TO ANOTHER. ACCORDINGLY, THIS PRINCIPLE WOULD INVOLVE A CAREFUL DETERMINATION BY STATES AS TO WHETHER CERTAIN TYPES OR QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS WOULD BE DESTABILIZING IN A PARTICULAR CONTEXT.

23. ANOTHER PRINCIPLE MIGHT BE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACQUISITION OF ARMS BY ONE STATE MAY BE A LEGITIMATE CONCERN OF THOSE OTHER STATES WHOSE SECURITY IS AFFECTED. SUCH A PRINCIPLE MIGHT INDICATE THAT CONSULTATIONS AMONG INTERESTED STATES ON POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF ARMS ACQUISITIONS COULD BE USEFUL FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING OR ALLEVIATING REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. "INTERESTED" STATES MIGHT INCLUDE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AS WELL AS OTHERS OUTSIDE THE REGION. THE CONSULTATIONS COULD BE HELD IN THE EVENT OF A POTENTIAL OR OFFICIALLY ACKNOWLEDGED ACQUISITION OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO OTHERS, AND THEY MIGHT ALSO BE ARRANGED FROM TIME TO TIME WITHOUT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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REFERENCE TO A PARTICULAR ACQUISITION. THE RESULT COULD BE TO ALLAY FEARS THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE LEAD TO COMPETITIVE AND POSSIBLY DESTABILIZING ACTIONS BY OTHER STATES.

24. ANOTHER PRINCIPLE COULD BE FORMULATED TO REFLECT THE VIEW THAT THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY CANNOT, AND SHOULD NOT,

BE BASED SOLELY ON POLITICAL-MILITARY CRITERIA, BUT MUST ALSO ENCOMPASS PROGRESS IN THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL FIELDS. SUCH A PRINCIPLE MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, ENCOURAGE STATES TO LIMIT THEIR ACQUISITION OF ARMS TO THOSE DEEMED INDISPENSABLE FOR THEIR SECURITY SO THAT RESOURCES WOULD NOT UNNECESSARILY BE DIVERTED FROM ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. WHILE STATES THEMSELVES MUST BE THE JUDGE OF THEIR NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND OF WHAT IS INDISPENSABLE FOR THEIR SECURITY, ACCEPTANCE OF A PRINCIPLE ALONG THESE LINES BY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF STATES, AND REAL EFFORTS TO ABIDE BY IT, COULD INCREASE THE INCENTIVES FOR OTHERS TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH IT.

25. ANOTHER PRINCIPLE COULD APPLY TO THE TRANSFER OF ARMS PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES, RATHER THAN TO THE TRANSFER OF ARMS THEMSELVES. IT MIGHT RECOMMEND THAT THE EXPORT OF TECHNICAL DATA AND EQUIPMENT USED FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF

ARMS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENTAL REVIEW AND AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES AS ARMS EXPORTS THEMSELVES. WHILE ALL ARMS EXPORTING COUNTRIES REQUIRE LICENSES OR THEIR EQUIVALENT FOR THE EXPORT OF WEAPONS, NOT ALL OF THEM REQUIRE GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR THE EXPORT OF TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS. IN SOME CASES, THEREFORE, THERE ARE FEWER LEGAL BARRIERS AGAINST THE TRANSFER OF AN ARMS PRODUCTION CAPABILITY THAN AGAINST THE PROVISION OF THE ARMS THEMSELVES. ALTHOUGH OBSERVANCE WOULD NOT RESTRICT THE ABILITY OF SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS TO ENGAGE IN TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY, IT WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFERS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE CREATION OF ARMS PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES IN AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT, THUS HEIGHTENING TENSIONS.

26. WE BELIEVE THAT IF A WIDE NUMBER OF STATES SUPPORTED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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PRINCIPLES SUCH AS THE ONES I HAVE JUST SUGGESTED, AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEM, THIS WOULD HAVE A MARKED FAVORABLE IMPACT ON THE WORLDWIDE COMPETITION IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS. BROAD ACCEPTANCE OF THE VIEW THAT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CAN BE ENHANCED BY PRACTICING APPROPRIATE RESTRAINTS COULD FAVORABLY AFFECT THE WAY GOVERNMENTS APPROACH DECISIONS ON ARMS PROCUREMENT. IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH PRINCIPLES BY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF STATES WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP, LEADING TO MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS ON A REGIONAL BASIS AND FOR MORE BINDING RESTRAINTS ON A BROADER GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS.

27. THE ILLUSTRATIVE PRINCIPLES I HAVE DESCRIBED THIS

MORNING ARE NOT OF COURSE MEANT TO BE AN EXHAUSTIVE SET OF POLICY GUIDELINES IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS AREA; NOR SHOULD THEY BE REGARDED AS PROPOSALS IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. THEY ARE INTENDED TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION, TO FOCUS ATTENTION, AND HOPEFULLY CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS, ON AN AREA OF ARMS CONTROL THAT HAS SO FAR NOT BEEN AMENABLE TO EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS.

28. WE HOPE THAT OTHER DELEGATIONS WILL COMMENT ON THE APPROACH SUGGESTED TODAY AND POSSIBLY RECOMMEND PRINCIPLES OF THEIR OWN. WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN ANY ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR DEVELOPING RESTRAINTS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS THAT DELEGATIONS MAY PROPOSE. BECAUSE THE SUBJECT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IS ONE WHICH TOUCHES UPON THE VITAL INTERESTS OF US ALL, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE NEEDS AND DESIRES OF ALL STATES BE FULLY EXPRESSED AND TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR EFFORT TO FIND EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS. KISSINGER

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